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Abstract
This note discusses recent theoretical work analyzing the causes of fi nancial instability, 
its consequences for the macroeconomy, and thus the potential role for macroprudential 
policy. After discussing how information asymmetries and strategic complementarities can 
cause balance sheet losses to propagate through the fi nancial system and over time, we 
discuss the role of the major classes of macroprudential instruments in preventing instability 
ex ante and containing it ex post. We conclude with a discussion of current challenges for 
macroeconomic modeling and for the design of regulation and policy.
Keywords: banks, fi nancial stability, fi nancial regulation, macroeconomic policy.
JEL classifi cation: E44, E6, G2, G28.
Resumen
Este documento ocasional resume los avances recientes en el análisis teórico de las causas 
de la inestabilidad fi nanciera, de sus consecuencias macroeconómicas, y sus implicaciones 
acerca del posible papel de la política macroprudencial. En primer lugar, se analiza cómo se 
propagan las perturbaciones fi nancieras a través del sistema fi nanciero y a lo largo del tiempo, 
debido a las asimetrías de información y a las complementariedades estratégicas. Luego, se 
comenta el papel de cada clase de instrumentos macroprudenciales para evitar la inestabilidad 
fi nanciera ex ante y para contrarrestarla ex post. Se concluye con una discusión de los retos 
actuales para la modelización macroeconómica y para el diseño de la regulación y de la política 
asociados con temas macroprudenciales.
Palabras clave: bancos, estabilidad fi nanciera, regulación fi nanciera, política macroeconómica.
Códigos JEL: E44, E6, G2, G28.
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Introduction
The financial system trades payoffs across hypothetical states of the world, and across
time. Therefore it is subject to certain inherent instabilities, in which the valuation of
possible future outcomes makes equilibrium prices depend on the optimism or pessimism
of investors. Uncertainty about hypothetical futures also makes finance and banking
especially vulnerable to the corporate governance problems that are caused by asymmetric
information and limited liability in all sectors of the economy.
Events of the past decade have forced economists to face up to the risks posed by
financial instability, so research on how policy should address financial instabilities and
distortions has proliferated. This brief note provides a selective review of recent work,
with the aim of identifying priorities for ongoing research.1 We start by recalling the role
of microprudential policy, because many of the potential problems and policy instruments
under discussion in the literature about macroprudential policy are closely related to issues
already familiar from the microprudential context. Next, the note discussess how financial
vulnerabilities may propagate across banks at a given point in time, and through time
over the course of the business cycle. This macroeconomic perspective gives scope to ask
which channels and instruments of macroprudential policy can address the propagation
of financial vulnerabilities. The final section identifies major research challenges, and
concludes.
Banking and microprudential regulation
By aggregating risks (acquiring loans that pay out differently in different states of the
world, in exchange for largely riskless cash that pays off in all states of the world) the
banking system transforms numerous risky loans into a few safer assets, thus promoting
investment and growth. In this credit provision function, banks must monitor the credit-
worthiness of the investments of households, entrepreneurs, and firms. As banks specialize
in a monitoring role, they acquire superior information to that held by their depositors,
which implies that the equilibrium of the banking system may be distorted by asymmetric
information problems such as moral hazard and adverse selection.
On the other hand, by aggregating individual liquidity needs, a bank increases the
predictability of its deposit outflows, permitting it to economize on reserves. In its liquidity
provision role, the banking system safeguards depositors’ funds while providing immediate
access when those depositors need to spend. Thus, banks’ long maturity loans are made
on the basis of very short maturity funding, so maturity mismatch is inherent to the role
of banking in the economy.2 Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2002) point out that the twin
roles of the banking system (trade across time and trade across states of the world) are
1Hence, this note complements that of Menc´ıa and Saurina (2016), who discuss indicators and in-
struments for macroprudential policy, especially those in use at the Banco de Espan˜a. Here we provide
an overview of recent theoretical work describing the market failures that make macroprudential policy
necessary and determine its principal objectives.
2Without claiming that mismatch can be eliminated entirely, Goodhart and Perotti (2015) argue that
contemporary banking’s emphasis on long-term loan provision stretches mismatch to inefficient levels,
compared with the discounting of trade credit that was the mainstay of the banking business through the
first half of the twentieth century.
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naturally complements: both liquidity provision and credit provision, whether as credit
lines or as loans, require the bank to maintain a stock of liquid reserves. Therefore there
is an efficiency motive for a single class of institutions to undertake both tasks.
Given these two roles, banks are subject to two main sources of risk. First, due to
corporate governance problems, banks may fail to adequately minimize the risks in their
investment portfolios. As banks intermediate funds from savers to investors, their aggreg-
ation of risky assets represents an important insurance mechanism that insulates savers
from idiosyncratic investment risks. The composition and relative size of a bank’s invest-
ments, relative to its funding, determines the riskiness of its balance sheet, summarized for
example by its leverage ratio (the ratio of risky assets to the bank’s own equity). While
leverage is an intrinsic aspect of intermediation, it magnifies risk in the bank’s portfo-
lio, and may be suboptimally high. Admati, DeMarzo, Hellwig, and Pfleiderer (2013b)
explain how shareholder-creditor conflict may build up excess leverage over time: once
debt is in place, shareholders will consistently prefer to increase leverage by accumulating
further assets without increasing bank equity, even when lower leverage would increase
the total value of the bank. This leverage rachet effect occurs because the dilution costs of
recapitalization are paid by shareholders only, while lower leverage increases the expected
payoff for all stakeholders, including creditors. Excessive risk taking may also be driven by
banks’ incentive to concentrate their portfolios on riskier assets, which depositors may fail
to observe due to their informational disadvantage. This risk shifting effect results from
the fact that shareholders benefit from higher returns but are protected from increased
insolvency costs by their limited liability (see Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Bolton,
Mehran, and Shapiro (2010)). Moreover, the incentive to shift risks is increased for highly
leveraged entities, so the leverage ratchet and risk shifting effects reinforce each other,
pushing banks further from the socially optimal degree of risk taking. These governance
problems between shareholders and creditors may also be reinforced by governance prob-
lems between managers and shareholders, since monitoring effort is difficult to observe
(Holmstrom and Tirole (1997)).
A second risk is that, by providing liquidity insurance, banks expose themselves to
the danger of runs. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) argue that the occurrence of a run is a
particularly severe form of inefficiency, since the bank’s balance sheet is also compatible
with a different equilibrium in which no run occurs. Both the optimistic outcome, in which
depositors keep their money in the bank(s), and the panic outcome, in which one or more
banks fail, are rational equilibria under laissez faire; individual depositors can do nothing,
in principle, to shepherd the market from one equilibrium outcome to another.3 While
bank runs were once seen as a phenomenon related to retail banking, the recent financial
crisis saw banks such as Bear Sterns suffering panics in which short-term wholesale funding
was suddenly withdrawn. Creditors may gain de facto seniority if they hold assets that
mature first relative to the other liabilities of borrowers, so that when there is uncertainty
about default probabilities, both borrowers and new creditors have an incentive to shorten
maturity at the expense of current creditors (Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013) call this
3A large actor, such as the central bank, can influence expectations in a way that selects the Pareto
dominant equilibrium. Therefore Diamond and Dybvig (1983) argue that a regime of deposit insurance
may be welfare improving. On the other hand, the presence of deposit insurance diminishes the monitoring
incentives of depositors and banks themselves, so that the lender of last resort function goes hand in hand
with a supervisory function for the central bank.
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the maturity rat race), implying excessive rollover risk. On the other hand, Calomiris and
Kahn (1991) argued that short-term funding (demandable debt) can be an important dis-
cipline device to ensure that banks have an adequate incentive to monitor. In their model,
a large wholesale funder holding demandable debt internalizes monitoring incentives, dis-
ciplining the bank, which allows small depositors to free ride in the monitoring decision.
But while this might provide an efficient solution to the monitoring of a single bank, it still
leaves the economy open to panics at the aggregate level. Moreover, Huang and Ratnovski
(2011) reverse the conclusion of Calomiris and Kahn (1991), showing that if noisy public
signals are available, then short-term wholesale funding may instead decrease monitoring
incentives, triggering inefficient liquidations and increasing the frequency of bank runs.
Faced with the likelihood of excessive risk in the banking system, policy makers inter-
vene by supervising banks and by setting prudential policies at the micro level. Capital
requirements, one of their key policy instruments, serve to internalize bank losses, mit-
igating problems of maturity mismatch, excessive risk, and leverage at the bank level.
A common argument for reducing these requirements is that since equity is riskier than
debt, it is a more expensive form of funding, so that requiring higher equity holdings leads
to higher loan rates and lower credit. However, under the Modigliani-Miller conditions
(Modigliani and Miller (1958)), this is untrue: even if equity is more expensive than debt,
higher equity ratios decrease the probability of default, leaving the overall cost of funding
unchanged. Even when the Modigliani-Miller conditions are violated (for example, if hold-
ing debt has tax benefits, or if there is a “money” premium on short-term debt that can
be used as a transaction medium), the increase in the interest rate on loans due to capital
requirements is unlikely to be large (Hanson, Kashyap, and Stein (2011), see also Admati,
DeMarzo, Hellwig, and Pfleiderer (2013a)). Recognizing that capital requirements may
be insufficient to correct all possible biases – not least because managers may fail to fully
represent the interests of shareholders – leverage and liquidity ratios have also been added
recently as regulatory tools, aimed directly at correcting excessive leverage and excessive
maturity mismatch, respectively.4
Macroeconomic perspective
The need for a macroeconomic approach to prudential financial regulation arises from a
variety of externalities that may spread the vulnerabilities of individual institutions across
the whole financial system. When an individual depositor withdraws her savings from a
bank because she expects other clients to withdraw their deposits too, this is an example
of a strategic complementarity— an externality in which an action chosen by any agent
strengthens the incentives of other agents act in the same way. In the financial system,
strategic complementarities can produce multiple equilibria (banking panics) at the level
of a single bank, but they may also feed back across the whole banking system and produce
additional externalities on the rest of the economy. Market-wide spillovers imply that the
risk in the financial system is not just the sum of individual risks, but is endogenous, born
out of the collective behaviour of financial entities. Risks propagate both through the
cross-section of banks (“structural”propagation) and over time (“cyclical”propagation).
4See De Nicolo, Gamba, and Lucchetta (2012) and Goodhart, Kashyap, Tsomocos, and Vardoulakis
(2012) for general equilibrium frameworks that address the effects of each of these tools on the banking
sector.
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Strategic complementarities in the cross-section
Credit crunches and fire sales
The interaction between financial frictions and the business cycle was first explored by
looking at the role of collateral and its valuation. Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999)
explored a costly verification framework to show how binding collateral constraints could
lower economic activity and amplify economic fluctuations. Lower cash reserves increase
moral hazard problems within the firm, leading to a lower level of output, and thus to
lower income for other firms. Although the initial focus was on firm collateral, the same
framework was later applied to explore credit crunches generated through banking balance
sheets (Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010)).
Collateral feedback may go through the quantity of liquid resources available in the
economy, as financial intermediaries are forced to sell assets at times when potential buyers
lack sufficient liquidity (cash-in-the-market is low - see Allen and Gale (1994)). But the
feedbacks implied by this mechanism will go through prices as well as quantities (Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997)); lower prices caused by sales of distressed firms not only harm the
current seller, but also all other holders of similar assets. Balance sheet losses then spread
across the system, forcing other banks to sell too, lowering prices further and bringing
new sellers to the market. Thus, individual bank problems spill over to the rest of the
system through this pecuniary externality. This is inefficient, since market participants do
not internalize the effect of their asset sales on the prices faced by other agents, so each
participant chooses a lower liquidity buffer, ex ante, than the socially optimal level.
While in the first instance fire sales affect the prices of assets in distress, they may
also spill over to other asset types. Manconi, Massa, and Yasuda (2012) show that dur-
ing the recent financial crisis, mutual funds needing liquidity chose to sell assets other
than securitized bonds, since these were seen as “toxic”, so fire sales spilled over from
securitized to corporate bonds, and corporate spreads increased. Fire sales can also be
amplified through their interactions with funding and risk management considerations.
Garleanu and Pedersen (2007) argue that since banks restrict balance sheet holdings in
order to abide by a liquidity-adjusted value at risk (LVaR) constraint, tighter risk man-
agement may lead to a general reduction in asset holding. As a result, all participants face
longer expected selling times, implying higher risk over the now longer holding period,
which further tightens risk management, producing added downward pressure on prices.
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) focus on the role of funding on triggering pecuniary
externalities. Financial institutions use asset holdings as collateral to fund their balance
sheet holdings. A lower value of the underlying asset used as collateral reduces funding
capacity, generating a constraint on asset holdings, an increase in sell orders and lower
asset prices, which further decreases funding capacity as funding margins increase.
Flight to quality and liquidity; risk shifting
Strategic complementarities in the overall level of activity may also be reinforced by
feedbacks in the type of investment undertaken. A credit crunch may feature a shift out
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of riskier (more productive) investments, and into safer or more liquid (less productive)
assets. These could include shifts out of real investment and into government bonds, or
shifts from one class of real assets to another (for example, from small to large firms).
The scope for these ex post shifts out of risk may be increased by inefficiently high
risk taking ex ante. Limited liability may make riskier assets attractive to banks, due to
their potential upside gain. These riskier assets may have higher (Allen and Gale (2004))
or lower (Repullo (2004)) expected payoffs ex ante; in either case, shifting into riskier as-
sets will be especially attractive when expected profits are low, which means that greater
banking competition may increase risk shifting. Greater risk-taking ex ante means that a
crisis, if it occurs, will be more severe. In this way, risk shifting externalities may reinforce
other types of strategic complementarities discussed earlier. In particular, they may make
the economy vulnerable to a flight to quality when pessimism sets in.
Asset commonalities
Strategic complementarities may also be driven by investors’ asset allocation decisions,
if the payoff to a certain asset class increases with the fraction of other agents choosing the
same investment strategy. Acharya (2009) presents a framework where systemic risk res-
ults from endogenously chosen correlation of returns on assets held by banks. The limited
liability of banks, combined with a negative externality of one bank’s failure on the health
of other banks, gives rise to a systemic risk-shifting incentive where all banks undertake
correlated investments, thereby increasing economy-wide aggregate risk. Wagner (2010)
and Allen, Babus, and Carletti (2012) also explore mechanisms where diversification is
privately beneficial but increases the likelihood of systemic events as portfolios become
more similar.
Similarities of portfolio allocation across financial intermediaries may also result from
the prospect of government bailouts. Anticipating that simultaneous bank failures trigger
a bailout (preventing a systemic event) banks may find it optimal to correlate risk taking,
so that any bank failure is also a system failure (Farhi and Tirole (2012)). Peer bench-
marking may also generate externalities across banks, leading to asset commonality, since
poor performance may overlooked by the market if many other banks suffer similar losses,
while losing alone harms the banker’s reputation (see Rajan (1994)).
Modes of propagation through the financial system
The discussions above have implicitly assumed that the decisions of individual banks
and firms are driven by aggregate prices and quantities of risky and liquid assets. But
feedbacks in the interbank market may instead have a network structure, in which a bank
failure spills over to the rest of the system primarily through domino effects on other banks
with which it interacts closely. These domino effects may result from direct linkages or
from cross trading (counterparty effects). Allen and Gale (2000) analyze how contagion
acts under different network structures, and show that incomplete networks are more prone
to contagion than complete structures. Also, greater connectivity typically reduces the
likelihood of widespread default as it increases the ability of a network to absorb shocks.
However, when large shocks occur, their effects are amplified, since more counterparties
are affected. Rochet and Tirole (1996) also analyse the risk of systemic crises due to
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interconnectedness in the interbank market, making clear that systemically importance
depends on connections, as well as size. Information contagion is another possible form
of propagation: any bank failure may cast doubt about the solvency of other market
participants that have similar asset and liability structures (Brunnermeier, Goodhart,
Persaud, Crockett, and Shin (2009)). But while some central banks have made efforts
to model the network structure of their national financial systems (e.g. Gai, Haldane,
and Kapadia (2011)), the ultimate mechanisms are not so different from models in which
feedbacks occur through aggregate quantities and prices: strategic complementarities in
risk-taking and/or liquidity demand may lead to multiple equilibria or to inefficiently low
activity within a single equilibrium.
Cyclical mechanisms: strategic complementarities over time
The propagation of financial disturbances across firms and financial institutions nat-
urally generates propagation over time as well. Credit crunches and fire sales persist over
time because they leave lower profits in their wake, decreasing the cash and collateral
available to support the next round of investment decisions. But other relevant mechan-
isms are also at work. Crucially, an intertemporal analysis places focus on the contrasting
welfare implications associated with ex post and ex ante perspectives on policy responses
to financial instability.
Limited commitment
Existing literature on credit crunches and fire sales mostly takes collateral constraints
as given and focuses on ex post policy analysis, asking how to stabilize the financial system
and the economy in response to exogenous shocks. But some recent papers dig deeper,
using models in which demand for cash and other collateralizable arises endogenously to
study whether borrowing in boom times might be excessive, making the economy vul-
nerable to excessively sharp crashes. Lorenzoni (2008) and Bianchi (2011) present models
where ex ante macroprudential policies that reduce borrowing are optimal. In their models,
borrowers have a limited ability to commit to future repayments (called nonpledgeability
or limited commitment), which makes collateral valuable if additional liquidity is needed
before investments pay off. Since firms and households fail to take into account the fire
sale externalities that asset liquidation imposes on other investors, their ex ante borrowing
level tends to be too high, leading to excessive volatility ex post. Gersbach and Rochet
(2012) apply a similar framework to the banking system, incorporating a financial friction
that limits banks’ borrowing, to study banks’ balance sheet decisions. They show that
banks allocate too much borrowing capacity to good states of the world (overborrowing)
and too little to bad states (underborrowing). This is because banks fail to incorporate
the effects of their decisions on the price of capital (a pecuniary externality), implying
that this price is too high in good states, increasing bank equity (banks are overcapital-
ized) and too low in bad states, depressing bank equity (banks become undercapitalized).
Hence, these contributions highlight how financial frictions and pecuniary externalities
generate cyclical mechanisms that lead to excessive borrowing in booms (which could be
offset by macroprudential policy) and excessively deep recessions (which could be offset
by macroeconomic stabilization).
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Information flow and learning
Alternatively, overborrowing and excess volatility can also be explained by depart-
ing from rational expectations, to consider different processes for expectation formation.
Simply put, over-reliance on recent experience may cause investors to take excessive risks
in good times, and to panic and overreact when a downturn hits. On one hand, Gennaioli,
Shleifer, and Vishny (2012) and (2015) explain how the dependence of expectations on
more frequently seen (salient) states of the world can generate excessive debt issuance and
neglect of tail risks. Investors overreact to a series of good news, because such a series is
representative of a good state. A few negative announcements will not change their minds
because the good state is still representative, but a sufficient amount of bad news leads
to a radical change in investors’ beliefs and to a financial crisis. Likewise, similar results
can also be derived from models of learning— particularly learning about growth rates
(rather than levels) of asset prices. Broer and Kero (2011) show that a framework with
uncertainty and learning about the persistence of volatility regimes is able to replicate
the asset price increases observed during the great moderation (low volatility regime) and
its reverse upon the return to the high volatility regime. Gelain, Lansing, and Mendicino
(2013) show how learning about the house price process can better explain large fluctu-
ations in house prices, and they explore loan-to-value ratios and other macroprudential
policies in a macro model with learning.
Financial cycles
The cyclical mechanisms discussed above link financial frictions with the business cycle,
focusing on amplification of output fluctuations, and how boom times may promote over-
borrowing via pricing externalities or expectations formation. However, Borio (2014) and
Drehmann, Borio, and Tsatsaronis (2012) argue that “financial cycles”, identifiable as a
fluctuation in financial variables - especially leverage ratios and asset prices - are of lower
frequency and greater amplitude than the business cycle itself. Therefore, there may be
instances where economic conditions are improving but the financial cycle remains de-
pressed, and even situations where booms and busts coincide. Following Minsky (1986)
closely, they associate the boom in financial cycle with the existence of financial imbal-
ances that signal a buildup of risk that may result in a crisis. On the other hand, they
also emphasize that the duration and amplitude of financial cycles has varied greatly over
time. Thus, even though they show that downturns of the financial cycle are frequently
accompanied by financial crises, actually predicting the timing of crises on the basis of
this evidence, without further understanding the mechanisms that drive these fluctuations
and how they related to output fluctuations, remains exceedingly difficult.
Macroprudential policy - instruments and implementation
The main macroprudential instruments fall into three main categories: capital, liquid-
ity and credit instruments. Capital-related instruments include flat and countercyclical
capital requirements, leverage ratios, and restrictions on profit distribution. Liquidity
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instruments include limits on maturity mismatch and reserve requirements. Credit instru-
ments include caps on loan-to-value (LTV) ratios, caps on debt-to-income (DTI) ratios,
leverage ratios, and ceilings on credit or credit growth.
Flat capital requirements
Capital requirements have long been imposed on the banking sector, although their
main purpose has been to guarantee the solvency of individual financial intermediaries
instead of mitigating systemic risk. As a result, the current debate has centered on the
need to increase capital requirements to avoid the repercussions for the rest of economy
when a bank cannot absorb losses due to insufficient equity. Higher regulatory capital
requirements force shareholders to increase their exposure to declines in the value of their
assets (increasing the “skin in the game”). As such, higher requirements weaken the prob-
lems caused by limited liability, including the leverage rachet and risk shifting effects, thus
decreasing the likelihood of fire sales, credit crunches, and flights to quality, and they also
decrease the degree of asset commonalities in financial intermediation.
Leverage ratio
Capital requirements are normally set based on the size and composition of assets held
by banks, reflecting the underlying risk of the portfolio of assets, often measured in terms
of Risk Weighted Assets (RWAs). The risk weights set by the Basel III framework are
intended to capture the variability of credit risk exposures across different bank portfolios.
However, risk assessment is in many cases based on banks’ own internal models, or is based
on current pricing. Hence, any deviations in risk perception or pricing due to the struc-
tural and cyclical mechanisms discussed above that generate excessive leverage and risk
taking, might also lead to a downward bias in capital requirements. Therefore, leverage
ratios, which constrain the ratio of assets to capital, are also advocated as an additional
instrument to reduce systemic risk. Leverage ratios can be set at the bank level (Basel
III) or at the aggregate level (see Gersbach and Hahn (2011)) in association with capital
requirements. Leverage ratios directly target the leverage rachet effect, and also affect the
key structural propagation mechanisms, as flat capital requirements do. Moreover, given
that the biases in risk assessment tend to be procyclical, leverage ratios could also offset
limited commitment problems, correcting for the possibility of overborrowing.
Countercyclical capital requirements
Fixed capital requirements and leverage ratios impact excessive leverage and risk in
a time-independent way and thus work primarily against structural propagation mechan-
isms. Countercyclical capital requirements or buffers, which have recently been introduced
in the Basel III framework, are directly aimed at attenuating cyclical mechanisms. The
proposed adjustments of those buffers are linked with the medium-term movements in fin-
ancial cycles; they are currently based on a set of statistical indicators that track financial
cycles. The mechanisms that drive financial cycles are remain poorly understood, making
it difficult to assess whether the adjustments are inefficiently curbing credit growth or are
instead decreasing systemic risk optimally.
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Liquidity ratios and levies
Maturity mismatch is intrinsic to financial intermediation, since short-term funding is
the essence of liquidity provision, but it may also generate negative systemic externalities
through fire sales, flight to liquidity, and counterparty risk. Thus, while a bank’s decision
reflects its own exposure to refinancing risk, it has no incentive to consider its effects on the
rest of the financial system, so from a systemic perspective it relies excessively on short-
term funding. This suggests that additional regulation to constrain refinancing exposure
to the socially optimal level is needed. This can be done by setting liquidity ratios, as in
the new Basel III framework, or levies (Pigouvian taxes) on liquidity exposure (Perotti
and Suarez (2011)).
LTV and DTI ratios
Another set of instruments that addresses excessive leverage and borrowing, but which
control market outcomes directly instead of controlling banks’ balance sheets, are loan-
to-value (LTV) and debt-to-income (DTI) ratios. The first looks directly at the housing
market, since sharp increases in house prices are strongly associated with the peak of
a financial cycle. DTI ratios are more general, and attempt to curb all forms of credit
growth. Since these instruments are based on borrowers’ asset position, rather than that
of the financial institution, they have the advantage that they are effective for controlling
excessive credit growth regardless of whether it comes from traditional banks or from the
shadow banking system.
Other prudential measures
A number of other measures and institutional changes have recently been discussed. In
order to correct for the limited liability problem without generating excessive deleveraging,
regulators have recently introduced restrictions on profit distributions, forcing banks to
achieve sufficient capital by retaining more earnings rather than cutting lending. As re-
gards the problems of crisis propagation through the financial system, regulators have
recently promoted changes to improve monitoring of banking network structures and have
introduced additional balance sheet requirements for systemically important financial in-
stitutions to increase their Total Loss Absorbing Capacity (TLAC). This new regulation
ensures a better and faster resolution of banking crises, mitigating potential spillovers
through the banking network. The need for a framework to oversee payments and securit-
ies systems, monitoring over-the-counter markets, has also been receiving some attention
in the effort to decrease systemic risk.
Finally, an important aspect of implementation is how discretionary each policy in-
strument should be. On the one hand, ruled-based policies are predictable, reduce un-
certainty, and cannot be modified depending on current pressures or conditions. On the
other hand, a discretionary approach allows policymakers to improve their understanding
of how macroprudential policies impact the financial markets and the economy, improving
policy judgments. As our understanding of the main mechanisms and impacts of policy
interventions increases, rule-based interventions should perhaps become the norm, increas-
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ing transparency and accountability. But continuing financial innovation and regulatory
arbitrage could justify maintaining some degree of discretion.
Challenges in theory and policy design
We conclude by looking at major areas where further analysis is warranted, both in
terms of theory and of policy design.
Modeling challenges
The literature on macroprudential policies has advanced considerably in the last few
years, particularly in identifying important mechanisms that may generate suboptimal
outcomes and may increase the probability of systemic events. Nonetheless, incorporating
structural mechanisms that address fire-sales and other corporate governance imperfec-
tions in a dynamic setting that allows for persistent effects that quantitatively match
observed financial cycles remains a challenge. Hence, a unifying framework that is ad-
equate for analyzing the tradeoffs of macroprudential policies is still lacking. Apart from
the general difficulty of incorporating multiple mechanisms into a single framework of fin-
ancial intermediation, the modeling task might involve dealing with (i) heterogeneity, (ii)
multiplicity of equilibrium and (iii) departures from rational expectations.
A rapidly advancing DSGE literature adds financial frictions to standard macroeco-
nomic models. Heterogeneity ought to be explored further here, since collateral constraints
and other types of financial frictions are largely irrelevant in representative agent models.
Another weakness of this literature is that the dynamics are driven by exogenous shocks. It
is still essential to try to derive financial shocks and/or crises from feedbacks in imperfect
financial markets, as the policy implications of endogenous fluctuations may differ from
those of exogenous shocks. Better frameworks for addressing multiplicity of equilibrium
could be helpful in modeling endogenous fluctuations. Finally, although the empirical
regularities around financial cycles seemed well documented in, for instance, Drehmann,
Borio, and Tsatsaronis (2012), the mechanisms that drive financial variables and differ-
entiate financial cycles from the more familiar output cycles remain elusive. Models of
learning may prove crucial for modeling the financial cycle; Minsky’s (1986) theory sug-
gests that innovations in the recent past are salient for investment behavior, and plausible
calibrations of learning models often imply fluctuations of much lower frequency than
rational expectations models do.
Two recent papers have addressed some of these concerns, providing general equilib-
rium frameworks for studying financial instability and policy interventions. Boissay, Col-
lard, and Smets (forthcoming) build a tractable DSGE model with an interbank market
in which moral hazard and asymmetric information may generate banking crises, credit
crunches, and ultimately a severe financial recession. In accordance with the empirical
evidence these recessions are infrequent, are more likely to occur following a credit boom,
and are not triggered by an especially large negative exogenous shock. Brunnermeier and
Sannikov (2014) study a more stylized general equilibrium model in which collateral con-
straints cause asset prices to vary with the fraction of total wealth held by entrepreneurs.
Rather than analyzing fluctuations around a single steady state, the authors describe the
full, global dynamics of their economy, and show that it tends to fluctuate around two
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 17 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 1604
persistent states, a “normal” situation in which risk has only a small effect on asset prices,
and a “crisis” state in which investment is reduced by a high risk premium, which can only
be escaped through a slow process of deleveraging. A key source of risk for entrepreneurs
in their model is the endogenous riskiness of the price of capital. An important finding
is that price volatility may increase when the variance of exogenous shocks falls. That is,
less exogenous risk (or improved diversification through financial innovation) may cause
entrepreneurs to leverage up in normal times, increasing the endogenous component of
risk and making crises, when they arrive, more severe.5
Challenges for effective regulation
Major challenges for effective regulation include determining the appropriate size and
type of interventions, and anticipating potential side-effects both within and across sec-
tors. Firstly, given the lack of a widely-accepted macroeconomic model that encompasses
financial crises and macroprudential policy, quantitative analyses are still lacking. For in-
stance, the appropriate level of capital requirements is hotly contested. Admati, DeMarzo,
Hellwig, and Pfleiderer (2013a) discuss a series of misconceptions regarding banking cap-
ital (e.g. “equity is expensive”, “capital implies banks set aside resources that are not
used restricting lending”) and claim that higher capital, as required by the new Basel III
framework, entails large social benefits at minimal or no social cost. De Nicolo, Gamba,
and Lucchetta (2012) argue that even if capital requirements are initially beneficial, there
is a point where further increases become costly, reducing lending, efficiency, and welfare.
Note that this conclusion hinges on the restrictions to equity issuance assumed in their
framework. Another relevant consideration is whether regulation should focus on prices or
quantities. Perotti and Suarez (2011) discuss this issue in the context of policy to control
liquidity exposure. They show that quantity constraints are preferred when risk taking
incentives are heterogenous across banks, while levies are preferred when heterogeneity is
on the capacity to generate gains in intermediation (bank quality); therefore a combina-
tion of instruments might be optimal in general. Finally, adjustments to countercyclical
capital buffers are at present largely discretionary, loosely based on a set of indicators that
have proven to correlate to booms in financial cycles.
Regulatory interventions can have important side-effects and potential leakages. For
instance, countercyclical capital requirements are set to control increases in systemic risk
during periods of positive credit and asset price growth. However, as Horvath and Wag-
ner (2013) show, countercyclical capital requirements also create incentives to invest in
correlated activities, as it is relatively more costly to be forced to re-capitalize in booms.
This may lead to higher degree of asset commonality, which increases systemic risk. As for
potential side-effects, Aiyar, Calomiris, and Wieladek (2014) show that after an increase in
capital requirements in the UK, regulated banks do decrease credit supply. However, un-
regulated banks (resident foreign branches) increase lending in response to tighter capital
requirements on a relevant reference group of regulated banks. Thus, they observe a leak-
age within the banking sector. An important question requiring further exploration is how
macroprudential policies aimed at the banking sector affect other financial intermediaries,
5The paper of Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) also illustrates the techical advantages of moving
from traditional discrete-time macroeconomic models to continuous-time modeling, which may prove more
tractable for nonlinear analysis of economies with financial frictions.
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and what role these might play in generating externalities and increasing systemic risk.
Further constraints on commercial banks are likely to increase the importance of shadow
banks, which were already the entities responsible for most of the increased leverage ob-
served during the pre-crisis period. Adrian (2014) discusses regulatory policies directed
towards shadow banks. His proposal highlights the need to shift the regulatory instru-
ments from institutions to types of transactions (for example, LTV ratios are regulations
that shift the focus from banks’ balance sheets to requirements on mortgage contracts).
Finally, non-leveraged investors like hedge funds, who are motivated by relative perform-
ance ranking, might exacerbate asset price volatility (Feroli, Kashyap, Schoenholtz, and
Shin (2014)).
Monetary and macroprudential policy
Monetary and macroprudential policies are clearly linked. By setting short-term in-
terest rates, monetary policy affects credit and interest rate spreads, and thus influences
(future) financial stability. Macroprudential policy, by curbing excessive leverage and risk
taking, influences the terms and conditions of credit, and thereby the real economy and the
rate of inflation. A recurring question is whether some degree of coordination is needed in
this reciprocal relationship, recognizing that monetary policy has a role to play in financial
stability, or whether these policies can instead by conducted largely independently.
The pro-independence view claims that (i) interest rates are not an adequate instru-
ment to control financial stability and as such leaning against the wind cannot solve debt
problems (Svensson (2014)); (ii) even if monetary policy is effective in influencing financial
stability, monetary policymaking should ignore it since otherwise the goal of controlling
inflation effectively would be undermined (Weidmann (2014)); and (iii) if macroprudential
regulations are found to deal appropriately with all relevant externalities, there would be
no need for monetary policy to focus on issues of systemic risk.
The pro-collaboration view stresses that monetary policy affects financial stability
mostly through incentives to take risk. Prolonged periods of low interest rates may lead
investors to “search for yield”, promoting credit issuance, reducing premia and increasing
asset prices (Borio and Zhu (2008), Morris and Shin (2014)). This mechanism might
be important to understand the dynamics of financial cycles and hence, monetary policy
should also incorporate financial stability objectives, at least in the expansionary phase of
the cycle (see Stein (2011) and Borio and White (2003)).
Ajello, Laubach, Lopez-Salido, and Nakata (2015) build a framework that attempts to
quantify the potential tradeoffs for monetary policy-making when financial stability is a
concern; they assume that the probability of crisis varies with credit and thus with the
interest rate. They show that the optimal adjustment of interest rates due to stability
concerns is generally small but may be higher if the central bank is uncertain about how
interest rates affect financial stability. The crucial element then is to analyze how interest
rate movements and the probability of a crisis are linked. Given that financial cycles seem
to be of lower frequency, this might be related to interest rate persistence, which is not
explored in their model. Moreover, using interest rates to decrease the stock of debt is not
straightforward: tighter policy may reduce inflation and disposable income more quickly
than the stock of debt, thereby increasing real debt and the debt-to-income ratio. Hence,
using prudential instruments to influence the probability of a crisis might be more efficient.
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Table 1: Key References
Micro Perspective
Excessive Leverage Admati, DeMarzo, Hellwig, and Pfleiderer (2013b)
Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2002)
Risk Shifting Jensen and Meckling (1976)
Bolton, Mehran, and Shapiro (2010)
Maturity Mismatch Diamond and Dybvig (1983)
Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013)
Macro Perspective - Cross Section
Fire Sales/ Credit Crunch Allen and Gale (2004)
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999)
Allen and Gale (1994)
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)
Asset Commonalities Acharya (2009)
Allen, Babus, and Carletti (2012)
System Propagation Allen and Gale (2000)
Brunnermeier, Goodhart, Persaud, Crockett, and Shin
(2009)
Macro Perspective - Cyclical
Limited Commitment Lorenzoni (2008)
Gersbach and Rochet (2012)
Information flow and Learning Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2012)
Broer and Kero (2011)
Financial Cycles Drehmann, Borio, and Tsatsaronis (2012)
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Table 2: Instruments and Mechanisms
Instrument Cross-Section Propagation Cyclical Mechanisms
Flat Capital Requirement
(CR)
↑ CR increases skin in the game
⇒ ↓ risk taking and ↓ leverage
⇒ ↓ probability of fire sales, credit
crunches and ↓ asset commonalities
across banks.
Countercyclical Capital
Requirements
Increased CR in booms
⇒ ↓ less lending in booms
⇒ ↓ subsequent downturn less
severe.
Leverage Ratios (LvR) Quantity control on balance sheets
⇒ ↓ leverage ⇒ ↓ probability of fire
sales, credit crunches.
Quantity controls independent of
market prices and risk perceptions,
which tend to be pro-cyclical. Hence
LvR ⇒ ↓ ex-ante overborrowing
Liquidity Ratios and
Levies
Quantity controls and tax on short-
term financing
⇒ ↓ maturity mismatch
⇒ ↓ likelihood of fire sales and flight
to liquidity
LTV and DTI Quantity constraint: household
leverage ↓
Borrowing reduced on average, but
values and income are procyclical
Quantity constraint: corporate
leverage ↓
⇒ LTV and DTI might be ineffect-
ive against cyclical mechanisms.
⇒ ↓ likelihood of fire sales and
credit crunches.
Other Instruments
TLAC improve bankruptcy resolution
⇒ avoid crisis propagation
Monitoring of networks
and payment systems
⇒ avoid crisis propagation
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